The world isn’t prepared for the next pandemic
On Sunday, the World Health Organisation declared the Ebola outbreak in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo a “public health emergency of international concern”. More than 500 people have contracted the viral disease and at least 130 have succumbed to it in the two countries in the past two weeks. The WHO has warned that the scale of the outbreak is “likely larger” than these figures suggest. The emergency involves the Bundibugyo strain of the virus, for which there are no vaccines or therapeutics. The crisis has assumed even graver proportions because the global health agency’s ability to mount an effective response has been undermined by funding cuts, after the US withdrew from the organisation in January. Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK have also slashed their funding for the agency, forcing it to reduce its 2026-2027 budget by about 8 per cent. The cuts have reportedly weakened disease surveillance systems in conflict-ridden areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.
After the Covid pandemic, there was broad agreement that the world required a binding international framework to respond to a health emergency. The adoption of the Global Pandemic Treaty in May last year had generated hope that countries, barring the US, could come together to forge a robust health-security architecture. But the treaty was under stress even before it was ratified. Rich countries have been reluctant to commit to mandatory technology transfers or binding obligations on sharing medical resources during crises. Developing nations continue to distrust a system that allowed vast inequalities during the Covid vaccine rollout.
In the post-Covid years, the ability to detect emerging threats and develop medical countermeasures has improved appreciably. With advances in vaccine platforms, particularly mRNA technology, pharma researchers can design inoculation programmes at a much faster pace than in pre-Covid times. Yet, as the latest report of the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board —co-convened by the World Bank and WHO — points out, “the world is not ready to take on the next pandemic”. The Ebola outbreak is a stark reminder that containing infectious disease requires sustained investment in healthcare, scientific cooperation and international collaboration.
- 1India's pandemic governance rests on the colonial Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and the Disaster Management Act, 2005, with public health placed at Entry 6 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Supreme Court's 2021 oxygen-shortage orders in In Re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic underlined cooperative federalism as a constitutional value during health emergencies. Any serious external outbreak would test the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme and the National Centre for Disease Control's genomic consortium INSACOG, which sequenced over 300,000 SARS-CoV-2 samples during the pandemic.
- 2The Global Pandemic Agreement, adopted at the 78th World Health Assembly in May 2025, is the first treaty under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution since the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The United States' January 2026 withdrawal and funding cuts by Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have reduced WHO's 2026-2027 budget by approximately 8 per cent, weakening disease surveillance in conflict zones like the Democratic Republic of Congo. India, with major vaccine-manufacturing capacity at Serum Institute and Bharat Biotech, must balance its Vaccine Maitri leadership with the agreement's contested Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing provisions.
- 3Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits compulsory licensing during health emergencies, an option formalised in the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. India's Patents Act, 1970, particularly Sections 84 and 92, allows the Controller and the Central Government respectively to issue compulsory licences in public health emergencies, as in Natco v. Bayer (2012) for the anti-cancer drug Nexavar. Disputes over mandatory technology transfers in the Pandemic Agreement are the modern face of these long-standing TRIPS-versus-public-health tensions.
- 4WHO data show more than 500 contracted cases and 130 deaths within two weeks across Uganda and DRC, with the Bundibugyo strain not yet covered by any approved vaccine. mRNA platforms developed during COVID-19 have cut vaccine timelines from years to months, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) '100 Days Mission' targets a new vaccine within roughly fifteen weeks of identifying a novel pathogen. The Global Preparedness Monitoring Board's 2026 report nonetheless concludes that 'the world is not ready', underscoring the gap between scientific capability and political will.