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The Indian ExpressJuly 13, 2026

On Indo-Pacific, Delhi must match words, actions

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s six-day tour of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand came amid uncertainty over US President Donald Trump’s commitment to a balanced Asian order, his talk of a possible US-China “G-2”, and the Pentagon’s decision to drop the Indo-Pacific label . It underlines Delhi’s intent to strengthen its independent role in Asia and its Indo-Pacific waters. It also marks a new phase in India’s post-Cold War engagement with the East. The celebrated “Look East” and “Act East” policies broadened India’s ties with Southeast and East Asia over the last three decades. Yet India has fallen well short of realising the full potential of these relationships. Consider ASEAN. India’s trade with the grouping rose from about $7 billion in 2000 to around $125 billion in 2025. During the same period, China’s trade with ASEAN expanded from roughly $40 billion to nearly $1 trillion. The gap is equally visible in connectivity, technology partnerships and defence cooperation. The three-nation tour was an effort to narrow that gap by combining economic, strategic and security cooperation. In Indonesia, the decision to accelerate development of Sabang port could strengthen logistics, maritime domain awareness and naval cooperation. Expanded defence cooperation, including the sale of BrahMos missiles, highlights India’s growing potential as a defence exporter in Southeast Asia. In Australia, the decision to begin talks on a comprehensive FTA builds on recent trade liberalisation, while the completion of administrative arrangements for Australian uranium exports supports India’s ambitious plans for expanding nuclear power generation. Beyond uranium, Australia’s vast reserves of critical minerals and energy resources can become an important foundation for India’s long-term industrial growth. Enhanced maritime cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean is an equally important strategic gain. Modi’s visit to New Zealand ends a prolonged period of diplomatic neglect. The recently concluded FTA and expanded maritime cooperation provide a platform for greater engagement with the South Pacific, where China’s growing strategic presence is attracting attention. Taken together, the three visits point to a broader Indo-Pacific strategy that links maritime security, defence production, trade, technology and resilient supply chains. Yet, India’s principal constraint has not been the lack of diplomatic initiatives. It lies in the failure to implement them. The discussions on Sabang port and Australian uranium began nearly a decade ago. There is too much celebration of the PM’s foreign tours and too little attention to what happens afterwards. The significance of his Pacific tour will depend less on the intent behind the agreements than on the actions on the domestic front that facilitate their implementation.

Key GK Takeaways for CLAT
  • 1India's Indo-Pacific engagement, including defence exports like BrahMos missiles, is conducted under the Union government's exclusive constitutional authority over defence and foreign affairs, listed under Entries 1 and 10 of the Union List respectively. Unlike domestic economic policies requiring Centre-state coordination, diplomacy and international treaty-making rest solely with the Union executive, subject to parliamentary oversight through mechanisms like the Ministry of External Affairs' periodic briefings. This concentration of foreign policy power allows India to move quickly on strategic partnerships, though implementation of infrastructure commitments like Sabang port often depends on coordination with subordinate agencies and foreign counterparts.
  • 2The editorial's reference to a possible US-China 'G-2' and the Pentagon dropping the 'Indo-Pacific' label reflects deeper uncertainty about the Quad grouping, comprising India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, formed in 2007 and revived in 2017 to balance China's regional influence. India's push for BrahMos sales, Sabang port cooperation, and uranium imports from Australia parallels its broader hedging strategy of deepening ties with multiple partners rather than committing to a single bloc, similar to its stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The 2007-founded ASEAN Regional Forum and India's dialogue partnership with ASEAN since 1992 form the institutional backdrop against which this trade and security gap with China is measured.
  • 3India's uranium imports from Australia are governed under the 2014 India-Australia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which permits uranium supply for India's safeguarded civilian nuclear reactors monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The BrahMos missile programme itself operates as a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyeniya, meaning its exports also involve compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, which India joined in 2016. The proposed India-Australia comprehensive FTA would build upon the existing Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) of 2022, requiring ratification processes and tariff schedule negotiations under India's Foreign Trade Policy framework.
  • 4The trade gap the editorial highlights is stark: India-ASEAN trade grew from about seven billion dollars in 2000 to around one hundred twenty five billion dollars in 2025, an roughly eighteen-fold increase, while China-ASEAN trade rocketed from about forty billion dollars to nearly one trillion dollars, a twenty five-fold jump reaching a far larger absolute base. This means China's ASEAN trade is now worth roughly eight times India's, despite India's geographic proximity and long-standing 'Look East' policy launched in 1991. Closing even a fraction of this gap would require sustained investment in connectivity projects like Sabang port and consistent follow-through, which the editorial says has been India's historic weak point over the past decade.

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