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The HinduJuly 24, 2026

Escalation trap: On the U.S. and the war with Iran

The decision by Yemen’s Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia signals that the war on Iran has entered its most dangerous phase. The Houthis, a close Iranian ally, had avoided direct involvement due to a fragile but functional ceasefire with Saudi Arabia, despite their controlling most of Yemen’s population centres, including capital Sana’a. That ceasefire effectively fell apart on July 13 when an airport in Sanaa was attacked by forces of “Yemen’s internationally recognised government”. Based in Saudi Arabia, this government maintains loyal forces inside Yemen, though the Houthis remain the country’s most powerful and influential political and military force. Blaming Riyadh for the attack, the Houthis announced on July 20 a blockade on ships using Saudi ports on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia, whose crude and other exports through the Strait of Hormuz have been severely constrained by Iran’s blockade, has increased its reliance on Red Sea ports, especially Yanbu. Tankers from Yanbu to Asian markets must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. The Houthis control much of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb and can enforce a blockade of the chokepoint. When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz after the U.S.-Israel war began on February 28, all Persian Gulf states struggled to sustain their exports. Saudi Arabia, however, cushioned the impact by using its East-West Pipeline, which links its eastern oilfields to the Red Sea export terminals. If the Houthis enforce a total blockade on the kingdom, Riyadh could face far deeper economic disruption. This, coupled with Iran’s attacks on Kuwait’s desalination plants and power grid — after U.S. strikes on Iranian civilian infrastructure — paints a grim picture of the war and its regional consequences. If the first phase of Iran’s counterattack targeted the Persian Gulf monarchies, the second has expanded to include Jordan, which hosts two major U.S. military bases. Now, with the Houthi blockade, the war’s economic pain is set to deepen further. U.S. President Donald Trump had an opportunity to extricate himself from the conflict when he signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran on June 17. But by returning to war over disputes surrounding control of the Strait of Hormuz, Mr. Trump has not only squandered the opportunity but has also raised the risk of dragging the U.S. into yet another forever, unwinnable war. At this point, he is pursuing the same military tactics against Iran repeatedly, expecting different results. If Mr. Trump wants a way out, he should change course, push for an immediate ceasefire and return to diplomacy. Published - July 24, 2026 12:20 am IST Read Comments Copy link Email Facebook Twitter Telegram LinkedIn WhatsApp Reddit READ LATER SEE ALL Remove Related Topics Iran / Yemen / Israel-US strikes on Iran / Saudi Arabia / government / shipping service / exports / oil and gas - upstream activities / oceans / economy (general) / Kuwait / USA / population

Key GK Takeaways for CLAT
  • 1Article 51(c) of India's Constitution, a Directive Principle, instructs the state to endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, which helps explain why India has historically avoided taking sides in West Asian conflicts and instead calls for diplomacy. This principle underpins India's balancing act with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States simultaneously during such crises. CLAT aspirants should note that Directive Principles, though non-justiciable under Article 37, still shape India's foreign policy conduct in conflicts like this one.
  • 2The Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of the world's traded oil transits, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden are classic maritime chokepoints whose closure can trigger global energy shocks, as seen after the 1973 oil crisis and the Houthi Red Sea attacks that began in 2023. Iran's closure of Hormuz and the Houthi blockade of Saudi Red Sea ports show how regional powers weaponise maritime geography. For CLAT's international relations section, chokepoint disruptions are a recurring theme linking economics with geopolitics.
  • 3Naval blockades during armed conflict are governed by customary international humanitarian law, including the widely cited 1994 San Remo Manual, which requires blockades to be declared, effectively enforced, and non-discriminatory toward neutral shipping. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, to which India is a party, separately protects freedom of navigation through international straits. A blockade imposed by a non-state actor like the Houthis, rather than a recognised state, complicates the clean application of these established legal frameworks, a nuance examiners often test.
  • 4Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, built in the 1980s after tanker attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, can carry roughly five million barrels of crude per day from its Eastern Province oilfields to Red Sea terminals like Yanbu, making it Riyadh's main insurance against Hormuz disruptions. A total Houthi blockade of Red Sea ports would strip away this alternative route, potentially cutting Saudi export capacity sharply and pushing global crude prices higher. Gulf supply shocks of this kind have historically added several dollars per barrel to benchmark crude prices within days.

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